Introduction
Causation is one of the most important and contentious issues in social science. Any aspirations for a better social world, whether they concern the alleviation of inequities or the promotion of wealth, must explicitly or implicitly rely on beliefs about the causes and effects of government policies, social institutions, norms, or other phenomena that fall within the purview of social science. Yet everyday exemplars of cause and effect relations are typically drawn from relatively simple physical setups and machines such as billiards and lawnmowers. Indeed, the expression "social mechanism" reflects this transfer of concepts from mechanical to social. Moreover, many important questions in social science concern social systems and phenomena-economies, racial segregation, etc-whose extent and complexity make them difficult if not impossible to study in controlled laboratory settings. The result of all this is that causation is central and perennial issue for the philosophy of social science. This chapter examines three general approaches to studying causation in social science and the conceptual connections among them.
One commonly drawn distinction in social science research is between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Whereas quantitative research examines large sets of numerical data which are then analyzed by means of statistical techniques, qualitative research focuses in depth on a relatively small number of cases. A good representative of the mainstream view on the relationship between these two approaches can be found in the influential book, Designing Social Inquiry: Inference in Qualitative
Research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) , which I will henceforth refer to as DSI.
According to DSI, a shared logic underlies both quantitative and qualitative research and this logic is most clearly exhibited in quantitative research. Advocates of qualitative research, while mostly agreeing that there are important commonalities among the two approaches, reject what they perceive as DSI's characterization of qualitative research as the poor relation to quantitative social science (Ragin 2004; McKeown 2004) . Charles Ragin also critiques the "quantitative versus qualitative" distinction, arguing that the intended contrast is better drawn in terms of variable versus case oriented research (Ragin 1987 ). Ragin's formulation of this distinction associates the two approaches with distinct types of models: linear equations for variable oriented and Boolean logic for case oriented. I adopt the "variable versus case" version of the distinction mainly because I find the emphasis on types of causal model fruitful. Variable oriented social science research is also contrasted with mechanism approaches (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; George and Bennet 2005) . Mechanism approaches study causal relationships by developing models, often represented by mathematical formula, of micro-processes that could generate a macro-sociological phenomenon of interest. Advocates of social mechanisms often claim that they can overcome difficulties associated with variable oriented research, especially, the problem that a correlation found in the data may be explained by an omitted variable rather than a direct causal influence (Elster 1983; Little 1991; Hedström and Swedberg 1998) .
In this chapter, I explore the interrelationships among variable, case, and mechanism oriented approaches to social science research. I agree that there is a common logic behind variable and case oriented approaches, but I suggest that this commonality is best formulated within an approach to causal inference that relies on Bayesian networks (Bayes nets, for short). More specifically, the types of causal models associated with the two approaches-linear equations for variable oriented and Boolean logic for case oriented approaches-are two types of parameterizations of Bayes nets.
The Bayes nets framework, therefore, identifies model-general aspects of causal inference that pertain to these two as well as other types of causal models and thereby can reasonably be taken to articulate the "underlying logic" of causal inference to which the author's of DSI refer. One useful consequence of this analysis is that it shows how challenges often associated with variable oriented approaches-such as problems linked to omitted common causes-are also difficulties for case oriented research. Finally, I
consider the connection of mechanism-oriented research to variable and case oriented approaches to causal inference. Advocates of mechanisms in social science typically claim that mechanisms are valuable for explanation and for assisting causal inference. I focus on the second of these two claims here and suggest that the relationship between mechanism and variable oriented approaches is best understood by way of a distinction between what I call direct and indirect causal inference.
Variable versus Case Oriented Approaches
The contrast between quantitative and qualitative social science research naturally suggests a difference that has to do with numbers: quantitative researchers work with a large samples of numerical data that they subject to statistical analysis, while qualitative researchers delve into non-quantifiable features of a relatively small number of cases.
For example, this sort of distinction seems, at least to a first approximation, to capture central differences between such social science disciplines as econometrics and cultural anthropology. Those who pursue quantitative approaches to social sciences are more likely to see their methods as continuous with natural science, while a tendency to identify with research methods typical of the humanities is more common, though certainly not universal, among qualitative researchers. Thus, the quantitative versus qualitative distinction taps into an old and central debate about the nature of social science method and it relation to methods in the natural sciences. In this section, I focus on the positions taken on this issue in DSI and in reactions to it.
It is safe to say that DSI is the most widely discussed work on social science methodology published in the last twenty-five years (cf. Brady and Collier 2004; George and Bennett 2005) . The central theme of DSI is that differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches to social research are primarily matters of style rather than substance and that both approaches rely on "the same underlying logic of inference" (p. Ragin prefers to frame the "quantitative/qualitative" distinction in terms of variable versus case oriented research (1987, chapters 3 and 4) . This way of drawing the distinction focuses attention on the type of research question asked and models used. I adopt Ragin's way of drawing the distinction since I think an emphasis on distinct types of causal models is more theoretically fruitful than stressing the presence or absence of numerical data. After all, seemingly qualitative ethnographic research in cultural anthropology often involves the collection of numerical data on such things as the number of individuals living in households or the time spent on various tasks according to age or gender. The "variable versus case" distinction is also more useful for a discussion of mechanism oriented approaches, which are often quantitative in the sense of utilizing mathematical models but which usually do not involve statistical analyses of large samples of data.
Variable oriented research begins with a question about the impact of one or more variables on some outcome of interest, for example, the impact of gun control on crime or of budget deficits on economic growth. This type of question tends to treat the impact of a variable in abstraction from the variety of particular contexts and combinations of other causes in which it might occur. This point is closely related to an important feature of variable oriented research as characterized by Ragin, namely, that it usually treats variables as acting independently of one another. This assumption is typically implicit in choosing to represent the influences of the causes upon the effect by means of a linear equation such as the following.
Here y is the dependent variable (the effect), x 1 through x 3 are the independent variables (potential causes), α is the intercept, β 1 through β 3 are the coefficients, and ε is the error term which represents the effects of any omitted causes. For example, y might be a variable representing income, while x 1 through x 3 , respectively, stand for educational attainment, IQ, and parents' income. The research question, then, might be: what impact do these three variables have on income? Possible answers correspond to distinct assignments of numbers to the coefficients. To assume that the correct answer fits the form of the above equation entails some assumptions about what the correct answer could be, for instance, that the independent variables act separately upon y (e.g. the impact of x 2 does not depend on the value of x 3 ).
In contrast, case oriented research is motivated by an interest in one or a small number of cases. For example, a case oriented researcher might be stimulated by an interest to explain the bursting of the "dot-com" bubble in the late 1990s, a question that would naturally invite comparisons with other stock market busts. A key feature of case oriented research as understood by Ragin is that it is deeply concerned with teasing apart complex interactions of causes found in particular cases. According to Ragin, when pursuing a case oriented approach:
Researchers examine cases as wholes, not as collections of variables. An interest in interpreting specific cases and in pinpointing the combinations of conditions, the causal complexes, that produce specific outcomes encourages investigators to view cases as wholes. (1987, p. 52) Ragin's approach is intended for cases in which causes and effects can be represented by as conditions or events are that are present or absent. The goal, then, is to identify which combination of conditions (or absences) result in the outcome. Boolean logic, which will be familiar to anyone who has taken an introductory logic class, can be used to represent relationships among variables in such circumstances. This is best understood by way of an example. Consider the truth table in figure 1, which is adapted from Ragin (1987, p. 96 ). This table is a hypothetical example of a study of three potential causes of a successful strike (S): high demand for the product produced by the striking workers (A), threat that other workers will also go on strike out of sympathy or solidarity (B), and a large strike fund (C). In the table, 1's indicates that the condition is present and 0's indicates that it is absent. For example, in the forth row from the top, only A is present while B, C, and S are absent. rendering of the distinction, we can see that there is at least one difference that seems to be more than merely "stylistic," namely, the choice of which type of causal model to use.
However, the authors of DSI would insist that the common logic to which they refer transcends differences in the type of causal model chosen (1994, The focus here will be on the aspects of a common logic that pertain specifica to causal inference rather than to scientific inference in general. In lly particular, I will propose es w ayesian networks (or Bayes nets, for short) are an increasingly commonly used framework for representing r causal inference from 004).
to that the Bayes nets approach to causation is a good candidate for a general framework that clearly articulates a common logic of causal inference. I explain how linear and Boolean models are simply two distinct kinds of parameterizations of Bay nets. From this perspective, DSI is largely correct in its insistence that similar rules of causal inference apply to variable and case oriented research. In particular, I explain ho the possibility of unmeasured common causes-often cited as major challenge for variable oriented research-arises for case oriented approaches as well. An example of a DAG is provided in figure 2 . This DAG represents a hypothesis concerning the causal relationships among external threat (ET), external conflict (EC), domestic power inequalities (DPI), and democratization (D). When a DAG is used represent causal relationships, an arrow between two variables represents an influence that is not mediated by any of the other variables in the DAG. However, the arrow doe not specify the nature of that influence, for example, whether it makes the effect more likely or less likely to occur. Such information is provided by the probability distribution associated with the DAG rather than in DAG itself. Some terminology will be helpful discussing the relationships represented in DAGs. In a DAG, a node X is said to be a parent of another Y if there is an arrow pointing directly from X to Y. For example in 
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In a Bayes net, the probability distribution associated with a DAG is assumed to Markov Condition: Each variable in the graph is probabilistically independent o its non-descendants conditional on its pare 2 Notice that the definition of directed path entails that any sequence containing only one node is a directed path, since in that case the requirement that each pair X i and X i+1 is linked by an arrow pointing directly from X i to X i+1 is trivially satisfied. Thus, every node in a DAG counts as a descendant of itself. This seemingly odd feature of the definitions is deliberate and facilitates the statement of the Markov condition. requires introducing a bit of probability notation, especially the concept of conditional probability. A conditional probability is the probability of an event A among those c in which B obtains. This is written as P(A | B) and read "the probability of A given B."
An example of a conditional probability is the rate of unemployment among those who have a college degree, which would presumably be lower than the rate of unemployment in the general population. In probability theory, it is a standard convention is to use This means that when data indicates that two variables are probabilistically dependent, we can r infer that there is some causal connection between them, although we cannot infe from this alone whether that connection consists of one causing the other or a third variable that is a cause of both. Since a node with two arrows pointing directly into it is known as a collider, this ce. Plainly, the fact that Joe chose to go to Vietnam without being drafted will make us think it more likely that he was patriotic way back then. In other words, among those who are
Vietnam vets, we would expect a negative correlation between being drafted and (predraft) patriotism.
Let us return, then, to the variable and case oriented approaches to social research, which as we saw tended to be associated with distinct types of causal models: linear an to understand an important consequence of the Markov condition; namely, that it allows the joint probability distribution of a set of variables to be written as the product of the probability distribution of each variable conditional on its parents. Thus, the probability distribution for the DAG in figure 2 can be broken down into P
(ET), P(DPI | ET), P(EC |
ET, DPI), and P(D| ET, EC).
However, these probabilities can be specified in a variety distinct ways. For example, if each of the variables has only two possible values (present or absent), then the probabilities could be given simply by indicating the probability that the effect is present given each possible combination of values of its parents. For In this case, a parameterization would consist of specifying numerical values for α, β 1 , and β 2 , and a probability distribution for the error term ε. From a Bayes nets perspective, then, Boolean and linear models are distinct ways of specifying a probability distribution for a DAG. (1) and (2) are challenges for causal inference generally, not only for case oriented approaches. But that is merely an expectable consequence of the fact that these challenges can be explained in terms of the Markov condition and are independent of the particular choice of model.
The discussion in the previous paragraph relied on only consequences 1 and 2 of the Markov condition, but not consequence 3. Recall that consequence 3 asserted conditioning on a collider may induce probabilistic dependence. This idea is closely related to something known as "selection bias." Consider the following example of selection bias provided in DSI.
Suppose we believe that American investment in third world countries is a p cause of internal violence, and then we select a set of nations with major U.S. 1998, p. 17; Mayntz 2004, pp. 250-2) . In the description of the mechanism, the releva behavior of an agent is often assumed to be a function of the group into which he or she is classified. For example, consider the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski's (1 account of how having more wives was a cause of increased wealth among Trobrian chiefs. Among the Trobrianders, men were required to make substantial annual contributions of yams to the households of their married sisters. Hence, the more wive man had, the more yams he would receive. Yams, meanwhile, were the primary form wealth in Trobriand society, and served to finance such chiefly endeavors as canoe building and warfare. Although individuals play a prominent role in this account, they do so as representatives of social categories: brothers-in-law, wives, and chiefs. The categorization of component entities into functionally defined types is not unique to social mechanisms. Biological mechanisms are often described using such terms as "enzyme" and "co-receptor". The terms "enzyme" and "co-receptor" resemble "chief"
and "brother-in-law" in virtue of being functional: all of these terms provide some information about what role the designated thing plays in the larger system of which a part. In sum, social mechanisms can be characterized as follows. Social mechanisms are complexes of interacting agents-usually classified into specific social categor that produce regularities among macro level variables.
This characterization of a social mechanism can be illustrated by another, mo well-known example. Consider Thomas Schelling's bounded-neighborhood model, which is intended to account for persistent patterns of segregated housing in spite iesre increased racial tolerance (Schelling 1978, pp. 155-66) . In this model, the residents of a given neighborhood are divided into two mutually exclusive groups (e.g. black and white). Each individual prefers to remain in the neighborhood, provided that the proportion of his or her own group does not drop below a given threshold, which may Advocates of social mechanisms are motivated in large measure by concer about the possibility that a correlation may be due to an unmeasured common cause rather than a direct causal influence, a difficulty sometimes referred to as "spurio correlation" (cf Elster 1983, p. 47) . This was one of the general challenges for causal inference described in the foregoing section, and it is directly tied to the fact that the Markov condition allows that a probabilistic dependence between X and Y can be explained by e that is a cause of both (or any combination of these possibilities). Thus, in so science research it is often difficult to rule out the possibility that a correlation betwe variables is explained by a common cause that was not measured, and hence difficul provide strong evidence of a genuine causal impact. An elucidation of underlying mechanisms-sometimes called process tracing-is suggested by mechanism advoca as a solution to this difficulty.
In order to properly understand process tracing, it is important to be clear about its intended contrast. It is sometimes said that process tracing is utterly distinct from methods that endeavor to draw causal inferences from statistical data. For example, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett write that, "Process-tracing is fundamentall different from methods based on covariance or comparisons across cases" (2005, p. 207 ).
Yet it is difficult to see how thi then, exploits the possibility that the causal relationships among C may be more easily learned than those among V. One way this could be is if it is possible to perform experiments on the components, but not the system as a whole. For example, 4 Danks (2005) gives an interesting normative proposal for how conclusions about the causal relationships among distinct yet related sets of variables can be integrated within a Bayes nets framework. Wade, and that the initial decrease occurred in categories of crime disproportionately committed by those in the 18-24 age group (2001, . Not only does Donohue and Levitt's study illustrate the combination between process tracing and causal inference based on statistical data, it also illustrates the role of statistical data in process tracing itself. For example, the causal generalization that unwanted children are more likely become criminals is obviously a proposition that must be tested by reference to statisti data.
Moreover, Donohue and Levitt's study illustrates how a closer approximation o experimental data might be attainable with regard to the mechanism than for the system as a whole. Some studies on the effects upon criminality of being an unwanted child focused on locations in which governmental approval was required before an abortion was allowed, as was once the case in some parts of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe (2001, p. 388) . These studies found higher rates of criminal activity among children bor to women who requested but were denied access to abortions than among the children of 2001, pp. 395-396) . In addition, the small number of early legalizing states and the relatively small number of states altogether would make a statistical analysis more tentative. Thus, this example illustrates the point made above that, for a variety of reasons, data might allow for more firm conclusions concerning the causal relationships at the level of mechanisms than at the level of the system as a whole. In such circumstances, indirect inference is a reasonable approach to pursue in attempting to establish a causal claim. Of course, it does not follow from this that process tracing always necessary or even helpful for causal inference in social science. In some cases, the data may support a strong conclusion on the basis of direct inference and in some cases data needed for process tracing may be largely absent. But I think it is fair to that process tracing, understood as indirect causal inference, is an important strategy supporting causal conclusions in social science.
Conclusions
Learning about the causes and effects of social phenomena is an important but very difficult task. This chapter has described three approaches to studying causation that are found in social science: variable, case, and mechanism oriented research. My aim has been to clarify the relationships among these three approaches. 
